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THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION IN 
SCHELLING’S TREATISE ON FREEDOM 
 
I. Introduction 
Schelling’s treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom – the Freiheitsschrift of 1809 
– begins by outlining two methodological possibilities open to investigators in this 
domain.1 We can attempt to give content to the concept of freedom from a first-person 
perspective, seeking to retrieve through introspection our deeply ingrained feeling of 
our own freedom as self-conscious agents – a feeling which, Schelling emphasizes, is 
resistant to verbal articulation.2 Alternatively, we can take an objective and constructive 
approach, and concern ourselves with the problem of connecting the concept of 
freedom with other concepts, within ‘an overall scientific view of the world’ (SW I/7, 
336). Such linkage is necessary, Schelling avers, because no concept can be defined in 
isolation, and only the demonstration of its connection with the whole of a worldview 
provides its ‘final scientific completion’ (‘letzte wissenschaftliche Vollendung’). As 
this formulation makes clear, Schelling does not regard the two methodological options 
as alternatives. Rather, he thinks that the enquirer needs to follow both tracks, and that 
ultimately the two aspects of the investigation coincide (‘fallen…in Eins’). But as soon 
as he has made these proposals, Schelling notes a possible objection to them: according 
to a longstanding view, the concept of freedom is simply incompatible with that of 
system, and any philosophy that makes a claim to ‘ holeness and unity’ cannot help 
but deny the possibility of freedom. (SW I/7, 336) And yet, as he goes on to point out, 
‘individual freedom’, awareness of which he has just described, evidently does ‘cohere 
in some way with the world whole (whether this is conceived idealistically or 
realistically)’ – so de facto the incompatibility claim cannot be right. (SW I/7 336) 
Schelling’s treatise aims to develop a new conception of system able to accommodate 
freedom.3 
   It will be noticed that one of the distinctive features of Schelling’s approach is that 
the metaphysical conflict with which it deals – between the open future implied by 
freedom, on the one hand, and the necessity that must characterize the world when 
systematically comprehended, on the other – is replicated at the level of method. The 
problem of accommodating freedom within the structure of the world is mirrored by 
the problem of integrating the information which we derive from our direct, but elusive, 
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awareness of ourselves as free agents (Schelling asserts that the feeling of freedom is 
‘immediately stamped into everyone’ – ‘unmittelbar…einem jeden eingeprägt’ (SW 
I/7, 336)) and the results of an analysis of the concept of freedom, in its interconnection 
with other basic concepts. This inner duality of Schelling’s thinking is highlighted by 
his claim, in the opening pages of the treatise, that ‘without the contradiction of 
necessity and freedom not only philosophy, but every higher willing of the spirit would 
sink down into death.’ (SW I/7, 338) Here he seems to suggest that the double 
perspective – and the conflict it produces – is essential to our intellectual and moral life 
and keeps it in motion.4 It is one of the merits of Heidegger’s 1936 lecture course on 
the Freiheitsschrift to have foregrounded this implication of Schelling’s basic 
conception: 
The question concerning the system of freedom is not simply an “object” 
[Gegenstand] of philosophy, it is also not merely its authentic and 
encompassing object, but it is firstly and fundamentally and finally the 
condition [Zustand] of philosophy, the open contradiction, in which it stands 
and which it brings about again and again. (Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, 
69) 
 
   What Heidegger means by this is that our intuitive conception of freedom as a 
‘beginning having no need of a ground’ (grundunbedürftigen Anfang) inevitably 
collides with the notion of system as a ‘closed nexus of grounding’ (geschlossene[r] 
Begründungszusammenhang) (Schellings Abhandlung, 75). Philosophy must struggle 
with the fact that the spontaneity of freedom – without which there could be no 
philosophical activity – seems incompatible with own its fundamental striving for 
explanatory closure. But the ‘system of freedom’ which Heidegger mentions, echoing 
a key idea of early post-Kantian Idealism, implies more than simply a reconciliation of 
freedom and comprehensive explanation, however achieved. The basic insight is that 
freedom cannot be inserted or injected into the system as an afterthought, as it were – 
for, in this case, it would break the explanatory chain. Rather, the ‘system of freedom’ 
must be a construction founded on freedom. This is why Schelling asserts, at the start 
of his treatise, that if the concept of freedom has any reality at all, it cannot be merely 
a subordinate or subsidiary concept, but must be ‘one of the ruling middle points of the 
system’ (SW I/7, 336). But if freedom is one of the central points that organize the 
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system, how can it be defined by its interconnections within the system? How could it 
be both conditioned and unconditioned simultaneously? In what follows my aim is to 
explore these issues by examining two sophisticated recent attempts to decipher the 
argument, philosophical status and achievement of Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. 
Significantly, one of these – by Markus Gabriel – is more speculatively or theoretically, 
and the other – by Sebastian Gardner – more practically or existentially oriented. 
II. Gabriel’s Interpretation of the Freiheitsschrift 
In his short monograph, Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift, 
Markus Gabriel argues that Schelling’s treatise embodies a distinctive kind of 
metaphysics – metaphysics being the attempt to ‘think the world as world’ (AW, 7), as 
opposed to explaining the nature and existence of particular entities or processes within 
the world. Like his German Idealist contemporaries, Schelling is aware that any 
comprehensive account of the nature of reality must go reflexive: it must include the 
existence – and allow for the possible validity of – such accounts themselves, as well 
as accommodating the activity of the kind of agents who can produce them. Reality is 
such as to generate – or at least permit the generation of – metaphysical pictures of 
reality. Any theory of the world that ignores this requirement and blithely proceeds 
intentione recta is what Gabriel calls ‘dogmatic’. By contrast, Schelling’s style of 
metaphysics is characterized by Gabriel as ‘critical’. A critical metaphysics does not 
tacitly assume the existence of an unthematized – and therefore implicitly ‘worldless’ 
– subject of metaphysical thinking, as is often the case with philosophical theories 
which in fact can make no place for such a subject. Rather, a critical project in 
Schelling’s style is made concrete in the thought that 
the world as world is only through the fact that it is inserted into a transcending 
movement, which can only be carried out by world-beings. (AW, 10) 
   Two important ideas are compressed in this quotation. One is that the world can only 
come into view as the world contrastively: ‘For even the world is only through the fact 
that it is distinguished from something else, which it is not.’ (AW, 12) Hence the phrase 
‘transcending movement’ refers to a striving which must aim out beyond the world 
towards whatever constitutes its negative counterpart. Gabriel goes on to suggest that, 
according to Schelling, it is also through this transcending movement that the world 
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acquires articulation. Whatever it may be which is articulated, Schelling calls ‘being 
insofar as it is merely ground of existence’ (Wesen, sofern es bloß Grund von Existenz 
ist); while the process of articulation he calls ‘being insofar as it exists’ (Wesen, sofern 
es existiert). (SW I/7, 357) The ground cannot determine its articulation, for then the 
latter would be simply an effect of the ground, and not the result of its transcendence: 
consciousness of a differentiated world requires a free movement of going beyond.5 
Correspondingly, the existent cannot fully absorb the ground, for then there would be 
nothing of which it was the articulation. 
   Let us now consider what the movement of transcendence is directed towards. It 
cannot be an element of the world, for then the transcendence would not be of the world. 
But it cannot be an element of the same kind as the world – even if differing from it – 
either, for then it would still belong to the same logical domain as the world, and hence 
be drawn back into its orbit, rather than lying beyond it entirely. If the transcending 
movement of articulation generates – to use a familiar phrase – an all-inclusive ‘space 
of reasons’, then what the movement transcends towards cannot be a ‘reason’ (also 
rendered in German, in this context, by ‘Grund’). Schelling therefore calls it the ‘un-
ground’ (‘Ungrund’) (SW I/7, 407). The un-ground cannot be said to exist (since, for 
Schelling, anything which exists exhibits a combination ground and existent). 
Nonetheless, Gabriel argues, we can regard it as the ‘absolute’ that we require in order 
for the world to appear as world (see AW, 37-46). 
   Presumably in order to connect up with more familiar philosophical vocabulary, 
Gabriel re-labels Schelling’s ground and existent as ‘substance’ and ‘structure’, 
suggesting that these two basic dimensions of being stand in relation of unstable, 
antagonistic interdependence. This is because of the second major idea contained in the 
quotation: namely that the transcending movement has to be carried out by a being 
within the world (for there are no others), and therefore places this being in an 
amphibious position. We are ‘world-beings’ because we stand in the world, yet can also 
stand out from it, and can entertain the (contrastive) thought of its sheer existence. We 
are able to separate ourselves self-consciously from the ground; but we should not allow 
this capacity to deceive us into thinking that – ontologically – we are in principle 
detached from the ground, since, as Gabriel puts it, ‘Without the basis [Boden] of the 
given, of the world, we could not stand out from the world.’ (AW, 18) On Gabriel’s 
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account, this ambivalent status gives rise to anxiety, which we strive to overcome by 
dominating – and controlling the contingency of – the world. The world appears as 
contingent because  – in contrast with the ‘absolute’ as envisaged by other philosophers  
– Schelling’s un-ground, by definition, does not explain the existence of the world. The 
world’s contingency, in turn, infects us humans. It offends against the status apparently 
endowed by our capacity to envisage the world as a whole, dividing us against 
ourselves, and giving rise to the fundamental thrust of human existence, which Gabriel 
terms ‘Kontingenzbewältigung’ – the mastering of contingency (AW, 18). 
   Gabriel would probably concede that his interpretation of the Freiheitsschrift can best 
be defended as an exercise in ‘rational reconstruction’. But, as with all such exercises, 
judiciousness is required to prevent the imperatives taken to stem from the term 
‘rational’ from distorting the purport of the original text. In the case of Gabriel’s 
monograph, I now want to argue, such misrepresentation occurs. Certainly, Gabriel is 
respectful of the Idealist demand that, if human freedom is to be taken seriously, it must 
be built into the fundamental dynamics of the system – go ‘all the way down’ – and in 
this respect his exegetical efforts are instructive. But because he ignores the 
implications of the dual methodological perspective which Schelling outlines at the 
beginning of his treatise, he ends with an implausible conception of freedom. 
    In one of the most famous statements in the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling declares that 
‘Idealism in fact provides on the one hand only the most general, on the other hand the 
merely formal concept of freedom. The real and living concept of freedom is that it is 
a capacity for good and evil.’ (SW I/7, 352) One might easily assume that the prime 
way in which such freedom poses a problem for the construction of a system (Schelling 
immediately goes on to say that it has been experienced as a difficulty for ‘more or less’ 
all systems) is that the openness of the future implied by the exercise of free will is 
incompatible with the closure of system. But in fact this issue, though salient, is not the 
ultimate focus of Schelling’s attention. More specifically, Schelling regards his theory 
of the noumenal choice of one’s own moral character – an adaptation and development 
of Kant’s account, as presented in the first book of Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason (61-63) – as having successfully reconciled freedom and necessity. Like 
Kant, he argues that, although our actions flow necessarily from our empirical moral 
character, this character is itself the result of our non-time-bound choice of its 
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intelligible correlate. Human beings in general, Schelling argues, presuppose some such 
process – though, of course, not usually in this philosophically explicit form – since we 
do not regard an appeal to a person’s determinate moral character as a valid excuse for 
wrongdoing (see SW I/7, 383-388). So, for him, the most urgent issue is no longer 
individual freedom versus the necessity. Rather, it is the problem posed by the 
variability of moral choice, with many human beings opting for evil. The concept which  
freedom, viewed under this aspect, affects ‘most strikingly’, Schelling says, is the 
concept of ‘immanence’. By this he means that the inclusion of evil within the ‘infinite 
substance’ or ‘primal will’ would ‘completely destroy’ the concept of a ‘most perfect 
being’ (SW I/7, 353). 
    Here Schelling may seem to be wavering between metaphysical formulations and a 
more explicitly theological vocabulary. But this is entirely typical of German Idealism. 
Religious experience could no more be excluded from the Idealists’ attempts to 
integrate the divergent dimensions of human existence than any other basic form of 
experience. Hence their projects can be regarded as requiring a salvaging or a 
secularization of the religious, depending on one’s point of view. In the present case, 
the concept of a ‘most perfect being’ can be taken as referring to a world all of whose 
positive attributes can in principle fully unfold without thwarting one another, because 
they flow from or express a single, infinite ground. In fact, this describes what Schelling 
understands by ‘system’ at this stage of his intellectual development. Systematicity is 
therefore not simply a construct, but the anatomy of the world itself, which philosophy 
tries to reconstruct.6 However, the ethical-religious tenor of the characterization will 
also be apparent.  
   The problem of evil arises because for Schelling – again following Kant – evil 
consists in an inversion of the proper relation of the universal and the particular, 
whereby the individual, empirical self seeks to exploit or dominate – and thereby 
distorts – the universal.7 (This is, of course, the aspect of Schelling’s argument which 
Gabriel latches onto.) A particular being which arrogates to itself the status of the 
universal may, for example, assert its faux-universality through aggressive expansion, 
by contrast with that incorporation of particularity into universality which is both the 
ethically and the metaphysically correct order of things. However, Schelling does not 
base this argument on an ontology of bare particulars and abstract universals: for him, 
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the relation of universal and particular is best exemplified by something like the life of 
an organism, as it imbues the co-operating functions of the body’s individual organs. 
Nonetheless, even if universal and particular are understood as ontological vectors or 
tendencies rather than as discrete metaphysical statuses, as Schelling proposes, it is still 
possible for the appropriate relation between them to become contorted. In Schelling’s 
view, if such inversions were a permanent, irreducible feature of reality, then the 
‘wholeness and unity’ of the world – to take up the expression used on the first page of 
the Freiheitsschrift – would come under threat. But why does Schelling think this? – 
both that the world is a unity, and that evil poses a threat to this unity? 
   As regards the first part of this question, it may be useful to refer to some remarks 
Kant makes in the Critique of Pure Reason concerning ‘how the natural course of 
human reason is constituted’. Kant writes: 
First it convinces itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this it 
recognizes an unconditioned existence. Now it seeks for the concept of 
something independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is the 
sufficient condition of everything else, i.e. in that which contains all reality. The 
All without limits, however, is absolute unity, and carries with it the concept of 
one single being, namely the highest being; and this reason infers that the 
highest being, as the original ground of all things, exists in an absolutely 
necessary way. (Kant 1998a: A586/B614) 
Kant, of course, argues that – despite this inbuilt impulsion of reason – we must suspend 
judgment concerning whether such a single, ultimate source of reality exists. For 
Schelling, however, such a stance would be equivalent to destroying the coherence of 
the instrumentarium we employ to do philosophy in the first place and therefore it could 
not be sufficiently motivated, no matter how ingeniously Kant tries to restrict assertions 
of existence to the field of appearances. In short, if a necessary being is described as 
merely problematic or possible, this characterization contradicts its necessity. 
However, for Schelling the upshot is not that we can arrive at knowledge of God or the 
unconditioned as we would knowledge of some finite thing (in this respect he entirely 
agrees with Kant). Rather, as he puts it in the Stuttgart Private Lectures, delivered a 
year after the publication of the Freiheitsschrift, ‘The existence of what is 
unconditioned cannot be proven like the existence of something finite. The 
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unconditional is the element wherein any demonstration becomes possible.’ (SW I/7, 
423) The consequence is that, for Schelling, while the ultimate wholeness and unity of 
the world – as stemming from a single absolute source – cannot be demonstrated, 
neither can it be put in doubt as a presupposition. Fundamentally, if we did not assume 
that reality is held together by a single ultimate principle, we would not be trying to 
theorize a world at all. In this context, the theory of evil as ontological inversion allows 
Schelling to supersede what he regards as implausibly anodyne conceptions of evil as 
a mere privation of the good (SW I/7, 370-372), while denying evil’s ultimate inner 
consistency. He needs to show that the inversion need not be conceptualized as an 
original and permanent – rather than a temporary, albeit long-term – feature of reality, 
for otherwise the world would have two incompatible grounds. Not only would this 
simply push the demand for explanation back one stage, the Manicheanism be 
destructive of our ethical orientation. 
   By contrast, in Gabriel’s reconstruction, the notion of evil as inversion disappears 
entirely, for he portrays evil as the inherent condition of a self-conscious but finite 
being. As he puts it, ‘To be free means to be evil, because all free beings are world-
beings and, because of their unstable structure, world-beings necessarily try to 
dominate the world. There is no free individual who is not evil.’ (AW, 32- 33) But to 
assert that ‘Freedom accrues to the human being because he is radically evil’ (AW, 50), 
or that ‘It belongs…to the dynamics of the I to be evil’ (AW, 26), directly contradicts 
Schelling’s claim that freedom consists in a capacity for good or evil. Employing the 
metaphors of centre and periphery which are pervasive in his text, Schelling compares 
evil to a disease in which one organ, which should play its particular, subordinate role 
within the overall functioning of the organism, clamours for centrality, for dominance, 
and thereby brings the body as a whole into a state of pain and disorder (SW  I/7, 366). 
It is difficult to see how such sickness –– which Schelling describes as the ‘true image 
of evil’ (SW I/7, 366) – could be understood as the form taken by human freedom.  
   Admittedly, at one point in the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling states that ‘The vanity of 
the human being strives against this origination from the ground.’ (SW I/7, 360) This 
may seem to confirm Gabriel’s claim that we are necessarily caught up in a project of 
Kontingenzbewältigung. However, Schelling insists that ‘it is not aroused selfhood in 
itself which is evil; but only insofar as it has torn itself away entirely from its opposite, 
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light or the universal will.’ (SW I/7, 400) As we have seen, in Schelling’s conception 
ground and existent are not discrete, static layers of being, but can be better described 
as a particularizing and a universalizing thrust or striving of being. He highlights this 
feature by also referring to them anthropomorphically as the ‘particular will’ and the 
‘universal will’. We can characterize these wills as ‘proto-ontological’, because any 
actually existing thing consists of a specific tension and equilibrium of ground and 
existent. In one respect these two wills repel each other: the particular will strives to 
maintain its particularity over against the universal will, while the universal will recoils 
from degradation by the particular will. But at the same time, they are profoundly 
interdependent. The particular will or ground is not simply an opaque process of 
withdrawal and self-involution, but what Schelling calls ‘a will to revelation…which, 
precisely to bring this about, must call forth ownness and opposition.’ (SW I/7, 375) It 
cannot be disclosed as particular, except through recourse to universal terms. 
Correlatively, the existent requires a ground of existence in order to be more than 
merely ‘ideal’. (SW I/7, 410) Since each form of the will is bi-directional, striving both 
against and towards the other, there is no reason why they should not ultimately 
coalesce. However, such fusion would not entail the complete dissolution of the 
material into the ideal, or of the particular into the universal. Schelling’s most 
compelling image for this process is the manner in which a transparent object, while 
not ceasing to be matter, can become ‘the bearer and – as it were – the container of 
light’ (SW I/7, 364). 
   Gabriel, for the most part, fails to recognize the profoundly dialectical character of 
Schelling’s conception, in which the identity of each vector of being is not only semi-
dependent upon, but internally riven by its relation to its opposite. He interprets the 
relation between existent and ground in a unidirectional and primarily epistemic 
manner: the replacement of Schelling’s plastic conception of a developmental 
interaction of particular and universal wills, which between them give rise to the forms 
of the natural world, with the more inert concepts of ‘substance’ and ‘structure’ is 
telling in this regard. Thus he writes: ‘What is observed is ultimately the substance of 
the world. How it is observed, is its structure.’ (AW, 42) This reading, in which 
structure is apparently imposed on substance by the knower, simply ignores Schelling’s 
aim of providing an account of the relation of particular and universal which is both 
ethically and metaphysically viable. 8 In other words, it fails to explain how structure 
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can be the structure of substance, in the sense – that of a subjective genitive – which 
the Freiheitsschrift clearly intends. Gabriel’s attempt to deal with this issue by applying 
the term ‘structure’ to the relation between substance and structure simply compounds 
the problem: either he has thereby violated his own definition of structure, or he has 
generated a regress (see, for example, AW, 39: ‘Insofar as substance and structure of 
the world reciprocally presuppose one another they constitute a symmetrical 
structure.’). 
    Correspondingly, Gabriel reduces freedom to the thrust of transcendence as such, 
understood primarily in cognitive rather than practical terms: ‘The world being thinks 
the world. That is its freedom.’ (AW, 36) The result is a general account of the dynamics 
human existence as characterized by contingent individuation and the attempt to 
overcome contingency through the imposition of structure. This is summed up in his 
claim that ‘Evil is the individual, who asserts herself against the world.’ (AW, 30) Yet, 
to propose such an interpretation, Gabriel has to discount the passages in the 
Freiheitsschrift where Schelling describes the experience of being torn by the choice 
between good and evil; the good being, in Schelling’s view, that identity of the 
particular will with the universal will for which his principal image is the concentric 
relation between a circle’s centre and periphery . In the case of human beings, the 
particular will has become self-conscious, and therefore fears the loss of self entailed 
by its coincidence with the universal will, even though this is ethically required. As 
Schelling writes, ‘The anxiety of life itself drives the human being out of the centre in 
which he was created: for this [centre], as the pure essence of all willing, is a consuming 
fire for each particular will; in order to dwell in it the human being must die to all 
ownness, for which reason there is an almost necessary attempt [ein fast notwendiger 
Versuch] to step out of it into periphery, to seek there repose for one’s selfhood.’ (SW 
I/7, 381) It will be noted that Schelling uses the expression ‘almost necessary attempt’: 
he does not claim that evil is irresistible, and indeed his definition of freedom as a 
capacity for good or evil would not make any sense if he did. In a similar vein, Schelling 
describes how the will of the ground ‘necessarily reacts against freedom as the super-
creaturely [das Überkreatürliche] and awakens in it the desire for the creaturely, just 
as he who is seized by dizziness on a high and precipitous summit seems to hear a secret 
voice urging him leap down’ (SW I/7, 381). Although this response of the ground to 
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the abyssal character of freedom is inevitable, Schelling does not assert that we are 
necessitated to obey its call. 
   This last passage highlights the fact that, on Gabriel’s interpretation, the 
Freiheitsschrift cannot achieve what he himself proposes as its aim. For Schelling, 
freedom – the defining feature of an entity capable of doing metaphysics – indicates a 
position above and beyond the creature (beyond anything with a given nature). Only 
from such a standpoint can we glimpse the existence of the world as a whole. This 
means that, for Schelling, world-transcendence is inseparable from the experience of 
having to choose, since to transcend the world is to have no nature that prescribes what 
one does, unlike entities fully determined by their role and location within the world. 
In this context, Schelling takes the choice between good and evil as paradigmatic 
because, in our moral choices, we determine who we fundamentally are, and hence 
these decisions cannot be seen as simply an effect of who we are.9 As Schelling writes 
in the 1796/97 Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, 
‘We only become aware of freedom though the power of choice [Willkür], in other 
words through the free choice between opposing maxims which mutually exclude one 
another and cannot coexist in the same act of willing.’ (SW I/1, 440) Conversely, if we 
are simply defined by evil, if our attempts at knowing are invariably spurred on by an 
insecurity that gives rise to the drive for Kontingenzbewältigung, if we have always 
already hurled ourselves from the summit, then we are not in a position to detach 
ourselves from the world in order to apprehend it as a whole. The capacity to bring the 
world into view presupposes a freedom which Gabriel’s theory of freedom as 
coterminous with evil (with practical-epistemic egocentrism) negates.  
   In short, Gabriel can only produce his reading by ignoring the methodological 
dualism invoked by Schelling at the beginning of his treatise. Certainly, Schelling, like 
his fellow German Idealists, aims to produce a metaphysics which can accommodate 
the existence of beings capable of doing metaphysics. But he does not consider that the 
theory of freedom and its role in the world which we eventually formulate can simply 
ignore the phenomenology of freedom as disclosed in our immediate self-awareness. 
And the most basic feature of this phenomenology is the constant demand for decision. 
Human life, we could say, is an endless series of minor and major moral emergencies. 
Correspondingly, Schelling rejects the view that a drive for instrumental domination 
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(Gabriel’s Kontingenzbewältigung) is an inevitable concomitant of our selfhood. We 
are not essentially defined by an urge for mastery, which Schelling’s dialectic of ground 
and existent shows to be self-defeating. For him, the basic problem is the prioritization 
of selfhood – which is the source of antagonism, rather than being an inevitable 
response to it. Without such prioritization, there would be no stark opposition of 
universality and particularity, and therefore no compulsion: human beings would no 
doubt take many instrumental measures to secure their survival and well-being, but 
these could occur within a framework of reciprocity between the human and natural 
worlds. 
   Gabriel’s conception of the Freiheitsschrift as primarily a self-incorporating 
metaphysical theory simplifies Schelling’s method and truncates his analysis of 
freedom. It can therefore provide no answer to the question of how theory and 
existential description fit together in the text. An interpretation that puts the emphasis 
on the practical dimension, on the first-personal consciousness of freedom, but which 
also derives Schelling’s metaphysical claims from such consciousness, may therefore 
seem to have more chance of success. This is the approach taken by Sebastian Gardner. 
III. Gardner’s Interpretation of the Freiheitsschrift 
 
Rather than interpreting the Freiheitsschrift as stemming from the demand for a critical, 
self-reflexive, metaphysics, Gardner proposes that Schelling works his way from a 
mode of practical consciousness to conclusions concerning the ultimate character of 
being. As he puts it: ‘Schelling's argument from human freedom to general 
metaphysics, from the practical to the theoretical, can be viewed in the terms helpfully 
proposed by Paul Franks. Kant's Fact of Reason provides, Franks argues, a template for 
German Idealism, which adopts the strategy of deducing the actuality of the intelligible 
ground of the world (ultimately, nothing less than the ens realissimum), an ontic 
ground, from an epistemic ground, our consciousness of the normativity of pure 
reason.’ (‘The Metaphysics of Human Freedom’, 00)10 Schelling’s main alteration of 
Kant’s procedure, Gardner suggests, is to give due weight to the ambivalence of our 
moral situation: we are not only capable of respect for the moral law, as a normatively 
positive fact which discloses the reality of freedom, but are also profoundly susceptible 
to the pull of moral evil, where evil is regarded the inverse or negation of normativity. 
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Whereas for Kant the source of evil is a secondary consideration, which does not bear 
on the use he makes of the fact of reason (our susceptibility to the imperative force of 
pure practical reason), for Schelling the attraction of evil should be equally salient in 
the description of our practical consciousness, and needs to be accounted for. Gardner 
proposes that the dramatic differences between Schelling’s and Kant’s metaphysics 
flow from this. 
 
    There are important insights contained in Gardner’s interpretation. Certainly, one of 
the young Schelling’s aims was to correct Kant’s conception of willing by giving moral 
evil the status of an active counter-force. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant proposed 
that choice can be truly free only when it subjects itself to the moral law, since it is only 
through our experience of ourselves as moral agents that freedom evinces its reality: 
there are no grounds for regarding oneself as free when driven by natural desire. But at 
the same time, unless there is a genuinely open choice between alternatives, between 
right and wrong, placing oneself under the moral law cannot itself be an act of freedom. 
From the theoretical standpoint, therefore, we cannot understand how morality can be 
the realization of freedom, while from the practical standpoint we cannot understand 
how free choice can result in moral transgression. As Kant puts it: 
 
although experience shows us that man as a sensible being has the capacity to 
choose in opposition to as well as in conformity with the law, his freedom as an 
intelligible being cannot be defined by this, since appearances cannot make any 
supersensible object (such as free choice) understandable. We can also see that 
freedom can never be located in a rational subject’s being able to make a choice 
in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason, even though experience proves often 
enough that happens (though we still cannot conceive how this is possible). 
(Metaphysics of Morals, 52) 
 
We have already seen that, in his earlier commentaries on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, 
Schelling conceived of our consciousness of freedom as consciousness of choice. 
Kant’s conception of freedom as an autonomy that detaches us from empirical impulse 
– the conception which leads to his difficulties – is inadequate because ‘we can only 
think a positively moral action if we oppose a positively immoral one to it. This 
opposition must be real, in other words both actions must emerge in our consciousness 
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as equally possible.’ (SW I/1, 430). The conclusion which Schelling drew from his 
argument, however, is that our experienced power of choice (Willkür) is merely the 
empirical appearance (Erscheinung) of absolute freedom, of a universal willing, ‘whose 
voice only reaches us through the medium of reason’ (SW I/I, 433). Our experience of 
the positive pull of moral evil is – as it were – a transcendental condition of the 
experience of choice, but is not regarded as having any correlate at the level of ontology 
or metaphysics. 
 
   By 1809 Schelling had become dissatisfied with this solution, since it denies that 
moral choice is an ultimate reality, reducing it to one of the ‘necessary limitations of 
our nature’ (SW I/1, 439); on this account, in the intelligible world, our freedom is 
identical with the ‘absolute determination of the unconditioned through the mere 
(natural) laws of its being’ (SW I/1, 437). Schelling, in other words, eventually 
concludes that such absolute noumenal determination is not real freedom at all (in brief, 
it is Kant’s ‘freedom of the turnspit’), and that to settle for the mere appearance of moral 
freedom would be to fall short of the systematic ambition of Idealism: to achieve a 
genuine integration of the apparently incompatible ways in which human beings 
experience themselves and the world. A radically revised ontology is therefore required 
in which the instability of choice – the precarious relation between ground and existent 
– is built into the fabric of things (goes ‘all the way down’). The result is that Schelling, 
in the Freiheitsschrift, is no longer simply adding an emphasis on the Hang zum Bösen 
to Kant’s theory of the fact of reason, because he no longer thinks that there is any such 
thing as the normativity of pure practical reason; as the following passage indicates: 
 
If evil consists in the discord of the two principles, then goodness can only 
consist in their complete harmony, and the bond which unites them both must 
be divine, since they are one not in a conditional, but in a complete and 
unconditional way. The relation of the two cannot therefore be represented as 
arbitrary morality, or as a morality produced by self-determination. This last 
concept presupposes that they are not one in themselves; but how are they 
supposed to become one, if they are not?’ (SW I/7, 393) 
 
 As Schelling makes clear, he does not find moral goodness in a rational will that 
operates independently of our empirical selfhood (with the consequence that the 
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question of whether our impulses push in the same direction or an opposing direction 
is irrelevant to the moral standing of the will). On the contrary, ground and existent, the 
particular will and the universal will, are entirely fused in the ethical person. Being truly 
ethical cannot consist in rational self-determination, because if we have to determine 
ourselves to do the right thing, then we are already in a state of inner moral division, 
and self-applied enforcement cannot unify the two principles within us.11 Of course, 
one might always reply that Schelling has got the moral psychology wrong. But later 
in the Freiheitsschrift he presents the psychological implications of his metaphysics in 
more concrete terms. And his description offers – at the least – a plausible alternative 
to what he refers to as ‘our negative morality’, reflecting his basic view that 
particularity (the ‘ground’) can support and energize the universal (the ‘existent’), but 
cannot be entirely neutralized by or absorbed into it: 
 
A good without effective selfhood is itself an ineffective good. […] The 
passions against which our negative morality wages war are forces which share 
a common root with the virtue that corresponds to them. The soul of all hate is 
love, and in the most violent anger there is revealed a stillness, which has been 
attacked and aroused in its innermost centre. In appropriate measure and organic 
equilibrium they are the strength of virtue itself and its immediate tools. (SW 
I/7, 401) 
 
   But it is not simply that the notion of pure practical reason fails to fit the phenomena 
of our ethical life. Schelling’s point is that – as Kant himself concedes – the theory of 
the moral person as divided between transcendental freedom and the pull of empirical 
incentives cannot account for the attraction of evil at all. Because of his commitment 
to what has come to be known, after Henry Allison, as the ‘incorporation thesis’ (the 
view that no empirical incentive can move us unless taken up into a maxim),12 Kant is 
at a loss to explain how human beings could be tempted to adopt a fundamental 
principle which gives a dominant role to empirical incentives in the first place. It is 
precisely for this reason that Schelling is driven to devise a new theory of willing as 
‘primal being’ (‘Ursein’) (SW I/7, 350), focused on the repulsion and attraction of its 
particularizing and universalizing dimensions. 
 
    This theory enables Schelling to construct a narrative of the developing interaction 
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of ground and existent, culminating in the emergence of human beings – creatures 
capable of self-conscious freedom. A contemporary analogy to this move, which may 
help to make it more intelligible, is provided by Thomas Nagel’s argument concerning 
the presuppositions of ‘value realism’. According to Nagel, even value reductionism 
must be committed to realism with regard to some values – for example, the value of 
truth. Having admitted this, we must further concede that ‘Value realism must make 
sense of the fact that the biological evolutionary process and the physical and chemical 
history that preceded it have given rise to conscious creatures, to the real value that fills 
their lives and experiences…’ (Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 117) But since to regard value 
as a contingent product of valueless processes would eviscerate it, contradict its 
intrinsicality, which we cannot avoid taking seriously in the last instance, this requires 
‘The teleological hypothesis…that these things may be determined not merely by 
value-free chemistry and physics but also by something else, namely a cosmic 
predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable 
from them.’ (Mind and Cosmos, 123) 
 
   Such inferences – for which Nagel notes German Idealist precedents (Mind and 
Cosmos, 17) – are significantly different from the process that Gardner describes. As 
we have seen, his suggestion is that, by following Kant’s procedure for moving from 
practical moral consciousness to theoretical outcomes, Schelling has exhibited freedom 
and evil as ‘ultimate ontological facts’, and thereby satisfied our thirst for any further 
explanation (‘The Metaphysics of Human Freedom’, 00). Yet Kant is only able to use 
moral consciousness as the ratio cognoscendi of freedom because he takes us to be 
aware of a morality as an unconditional demand to conform to a principle of law. But 
we now know that if we think of morality in this way, we cannot account for the 
attraction of evil in the first place. Consequently, Schelling cannot be using a 
consciousness of pure normativity to support his metaphysical conclusions. Rather, 
following his twin-track approach, he attempts to construct a theory of the internal 
dynamics of being that is constrained by respect for the phenomenology of good and 
evil. 
 
IV. Schelling and Soft Naturalism 
  
   The sophistication and complexity of Schelling’s theorization of freedom should by 
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now be apparent. Nonetheless, a majority of contemporary philosophers would no 
doubt take the view that the approach to the problem of freedom embodied in the 
speculative enterprises of the German Idealists belongs irretrievably to the past, and 
that we now have more plausible means to manage comparable issues. I believe that a 
project such as Schelling’s cannot be dismissed so easily, however. In order to show 
this, I shall conclude by comparing the Freiheitsschrift with the classic essay by Peter 
Strawson which also deals with the relation between the phenomenology and the 
metaphysics of freedom. Strawson’s work in this area, in fact, pioneered the ‘soft 
naturalism’ which is now widely regarded as resolving many problems which drove the 
speculative efforts of the Idealists.13 
    
   In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ Strawson famously argues that adopting the 
objectifying attitude towards human beings which some adamant determinists believe 
should follow from the theoretical truth of their doctrine would involve the 
generalization of a stance which we currently adopt only when special circumstances, 
or the unusual characteristics of the person concerned, persuade us that our normal 
responses to the human other should be put out of play. However, in Strawson’s view 
this is ‘practically inconceivable’. We cannot take seriously the thought that ‘general 
theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any 
such things as inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them.’ (‘Freedom 
and Resentment’, 12) To claim that a decision to abandon such relationships would be 
the rational consequence of a certain theoretical truth would be to put in doubt the very 
meaning of the term ‘rational’. For in what sense would it not be more rational, even if 
such a truth could be established, to preserve the essential qualities of our human form 
of life? At the same time, Strawson denies that we need recourse to what he calls the 
‘obscure and panicky metaphysics of libertarianism’ (‘Freedom and Resentment’, 27) 
in order to provide backing for our spontaneous moral responses of blame, resentment, 
indignation, and so forth, along with their positive correlates. Such responses express 
our human nature, and there is nothing beyond this to which we can – or need to – 
appeal.  
 
   While both Schelling and Strawson make use of existential description as an 
irreplaceable element in their strategies (a large part of Strawson’s essay, in fact, 
consists not of philosophical argument in any standard sense, but simply of piling on 
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the phenomenology), there are evidently major differences between them. Firstly, while 
Schelling does not think that a deterministic system, however tightly constructed, could 
force us to gainsay our feeling of our own freedom, he argues – as we have seen – that 
our struggle with the relation between freedom and necessity lies at the very heart of 
philosophy and animates it. This means that the kind of shoulder-shrugging solution 
proposed by Strawson, in which a de facto acceptance of determinism (or, at least, a 
naturalistic aversion to libertarianism) is regarded as compatible with our normal moral 
practices of praise and blame, reward and punishment, is not an option for Schelling. 
Certainly, determinism cannot definitively overwhelm our ingrained consciousness of 
freedom, but – in Schelling’s view – failure to show the ‘connection between the 
concept of freedom and the whole of our view of the world’ (‘der Zusammenhang des 
Begriffs der Freiheit mit dem Ganzen der Weltansicht’) can render the concept of 
freedom ‘unstable’ (‘wankend’) – vulnerable to recurrent skeptical doubt. (SW I/7, 338) 
Furthermore, for Schelling, the conflict between the objectifying view of human beings, 
and the first-personal or existential one, is not simply an ivory tower dispute, but is a 
disturbing feature of modern societies. The ‘split between head and heart’ to which 
Schelling refers elsewhere in the text (SW I/7, 348) can be seen as foreshadowing the 
threat of what has come to be known as ‘nihilism’.14 The consequence is that, in contrast 
to Strawson’s complaisance, Schelling is convinced that freedom and necessity need to 
be interconnected through a philosophical effort that goes far beyond the mere 
description of our habitual moral responses, or an appeal to our inexpugnable feeling 
of freedom. They need to be reconciled in two different senses. It must be shown that, 
even though our actions may flow with necessity from our character, that character can 
be understood as freely chosen in some non-empirical sense. But, secondly, we need 
reassurance that, assuming freedom is fundamental in this way, the long-term result is 
not chaos. For the belief that the world is – deep down – morally chaotic would be no 
less potentially nihilistic than determinism. This is the point at which Schelling’s 
argument that the world must form a system acquires its motivational significance – 
becomes, in the idiom of the time, a project of theodicy. 
 
   Perhaps some might still respond that, from a Strawsonian or ‘soft naturalistic’ 
perspective, there is no need for all this grandiose fuss. Evidently, there are dangers 
involved in allowing the objectifying perspective on human beings to invade the 
lifeworld on unsuitable occasions or in inappropriate ways (for example, as when 
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politicians urge us to behave as though different ‘races’ were driven by a Darwinian 
struggle for supremacy); but so long as we maintain a hygienic division of labour 
between perspectives, no harm is done, and we can simultaneously avoid metaphysical 
extravagance. However, as Gardner has argued elsewhere, the soft naturalist, on pain 
of conceding to hard naturalism, is still obliged to adopt a meta-perspective from which 
the first-personal and objectifying perspective can each be endorsed as genuinely 
disclosing reality in its own way. (see Gardner, ‘The Limits of Naturalism’, 33-34) For 
if the soft naturalist abstains from ontology, and contends that purpose, intentionality, 
accountability, and so forth merely look real from within the lifeworld perspective, then 
the hard naturalist can reply: ‘exactly’. In this respect, there is no difference between 
Schelling and the soft naturalist in terms of the philosophical altitude – though evidently 
in terms of the degree of elaboration – of the viewpoint which asserts the validity of 
both perspectives.15 
    
   This last claim will no doubt appear contentious, and it may therefore be worth 
spending a little more time considering it. In his lecture series, Skepticism and 
Naturalism: Some Varieties, Strawson further developed the position put forward in 
‘Freedom and Resentment’. The essay had strongly hinted that the truth of determinism 
(or at least the implausibility of libertarianism) was not being contested. In the book, 
however, Strawson is more even-handed. He def nds what he calls ‘a certain ultimate 
relativity in our conception of the real’: (Skepticism and Naturalism, 44) a 
‘reconciliation of apparently conflicting views’ can be achieved ‘by relativizing the 
conception of the real, of what really exists or is really the case, to different 
standpoints’. (94-95) Concomitantly, Strawson denies that there is any ‘superior 
standpoint’ (53) beyond that of hard or ‘reductionist’ naturalism and soft or ‘catholic’ 
naturalism. But Strawson’s train of argument is inconsistent. His proposed 
reconciliation already presupposes a superior standpoint which relativizes hard 
naturalism and the lifeworld perspective (in contradiction to the consciousness of their 
proponents). Furthermore, this manoevre has not reconciled the ‘apparently conflicting 
views’, because these views are not like two perspectives on a physical object, for 
example. They make incompatible claims regarding the constitution of the world, and 
if they are genuine ‘conceptions of the real’ with an – albeit qualified – validity, rather 
than just imaginings, it still needs to be shown how the real can accommodate both of 
them. Strawson offers no argument to show that such an enterprise is not possible. He 
Page 19 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
	  	   20	  
simply assumes that a claim to comprehensiveness could only be based on the inflation 
of one or the other perspective, ruling out their joint supersession in a new construction. 
This leaves him entangled in the performative contradiction of denying the possibility 
of the meta-perspective. There are general lessons to be drawn for the standing of soft 
naturalism. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
As his own critique of soft naturalism would lead one to expect, Gardner’s essay on the 
Freiheitsschrift reaches a sympathetic, subtle and suggestive conclusion. He proposes 
that Schelling’s achievement is to have transformed incomprehensibility – i.e. the 
incomprehensibility of freedom – from an indication of the limit of our powers of 
cognition (as in Kant) into a feature of reality as such (this move is highlighted by 
Schelling’s claim that the ‘ground’ embodies the ‘ungraspable basis of reality, the 
indivisible remainder which cannot be assimilated by the understanding even with the 
greatest effort’ (SW I/7, 360)). Gardner summarizes: 
 
Thus one might say that Schelling has eliminated the incomprehensibility of 
freedom asserted by Kant, but without providing a comprehension of freedom; 
and, with reference to the problem of evil, that what Schelling has done is to 
allow the question, Why is there evil?, to receive the answer, For no reason – 
he has supplied conditions under which this counts as the complete and correct 
answer. The Freedom essay may do the work of the Theodicy in exonerating 
God and reconciling us to existence, but the means employed are the reverse of 
Leibniz's. (‘The Metaphysics of Human Freedom’, 00) 
 
However, Schelling does not think that the tasks of a theodicy can be fulfilled simply 
by disclosing the bare facticity of freedom and evil. For one thing, in contrast to Kant, 
he wants to make the choice of evil intelligible, given the dilemmas of human selfhood, 
even though it may not be ultimately rational; intelligible in the way that we can see 
why a person might balk at an ultimately life-saving amputation. But furthermore, his 
aim is to understand how and why evil must come to an end – this being the temporal 
facet of satisfying the demand for a system. In other words, Schelling has to work 
through both aspects his dual methodological perspective. And this returns us to the 
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question which was left open at the end of our consideration of Gabriel: does Schelling 
in fact achieve his goal of reconciling these two ways of seeing? 
 
   I would argue that the Freiheitschrift is a magnificent failure in this respect. This is 
because Schelling had not yet adequately worked out how to integrate the theoretical 
and existential aspects of his enterprise.16 Or, more precisely, he was not yet up to the 
even more perplexing task of integrating these aspects, without suppressing the conflict 
of freedom and necessity which he claims to be intellectually and spiritually vital. 
Ultimately, in the Freiheitsschrift, he gives the priority to theory, as his opening 
suggestion that our immediate awareness of freedom needs to be given ‘final scientific 
completion’ indicates (SW I/7, 336). This theoreticism is also revealed by his 
assumption that the world – understood as the process of God’s self-disclosure – must 
be characterized by moral perfection, as opposed to regarding the notion of such 
perfection as implying – through not necessarily as exhausted by – a practical demand. 
Schelling shows why evil is self-destructive, since its involution tends towards a pure 
particularity which is ontologically self-cancelling. But he is unable to justify his 
metaphysical prediction that our freedom could not allow evil, as such a tendency, 
repeatedly to erupt in ever-new forms, as opposed to declining, in the long term, 
towards zero. 
 
    The problem continued to preoccupy Schelling deeply, and he did not achieve a more 
durable solution until, in his first Munich lecture course of 1827/28, he began to 
elaborate the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ philosophy (see Schelling, 
System der Weltalter, 83-92). Negative philosophy is the a priori science of 
conceptualized being, but it is unable to provide the why of being, to render the world’s 
existence intelligible in terms of origination and purposiveness, since operations of pure 
reason – Schelling now concurs explicitly with Kant – strive towards but are unable to 
establish the reality of the unconditioned. Positive philosophy is a hermeneutics of the 
developmental history of human consciousness, guided by the categories generated by 
negative philosophy. The transition between negative and positive philosophy consists 
of a moment in which reason is ‘posited outside itself’ (‘aus sich gesetzt’), opens itself 
up to the ‘un-pre-thinkable’ (‘unvordenklich’) source from which the world and its 
history spring. But is this origin freedom, and therefore potentially reason – or is it 
merely the brute, coercive facticity of being (‘das Blindseyende’)? (see, e.g., Schelling, 
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Philosophie der Offenbarung, 154-160) Schelling’s final proposal is that there is no 
purely theoretical answer to this question, and therefore no definitive overcoming of 
the conflict between freedom and necessity. We can only say that there will have been 
freedom, to the extent that – practically and ethically – human beings overcome the 
Hang zum Bösen, succeed in abandoning the striving to be the ground of their own 
freedom. It is from this future anterior that human existence hangs suspended. 
 
Abbreviations 
Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke (Schelling, F. W. J. Sämmtliche Werke, edited by K. F. 
A. Schelling. Stuttgart/Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856-61) are referred to in the following 
form: SW I/1 = Sämmtliche Werke, division I, volume 1. The Freiheitsschrift occupies 
I/7, 331-416. A convenient recent edition of the text, with excellent notes, introduction 
and scholarly apparatus, has been produced by Thomas Buchheim for Felix Meiner 
Verlag, Hamburg (2nd improved edition 2011); this edition contains the Sämmtliche 
Werke pagination and can thus be employed to find the references provided in the 
present article. There exists a classic English translation of the Freiheitsschrift which, 
despite various faults, is still serviceable (Schelling, Of Human Freedom, translated by 
James Gutman. Chicago: Open Court, 1936 (many reprints)). Since this edition also 
contains the Sämmtliche Werke pagination it can be also used to find the passages to 
which I refer. However, all translations from German texts in this article are my own. 
AW: Markus Gabriel, Das Absolute und die Welt in Schellings Freiheitsschrift. Bonn: 
University Press Bonn, 2006. 
Notes	  	  1	  Thanks are due to Hauke Brunkhorst, Sebastian Gardner, Wayne Martin and two 
anonymous reviewers for the BJHP for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
2 Schelling’s use of the term ‘feeling’ refers not to a psychological process or event, but 
to a basic – perhaps the basic – form of self-consciousness. Schelling states that the 
feeling concerned is of the ‘fact of freedom’ (die Tatsache der Freiheit) (SW I/7, 336). 
Clearly, facts are not among the kinds of things which human beings are normally said 
to ‘feel’. In a comparable context, to which we will return later, Peter Strawson refers 
to ‘that sense of agency or freedom or responsibility which we feel in ourselves and 
attribute to others’. (Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism, 32) 
3  The conception of system at work in German Idealism requires the structure of reality 
to follow with intelligible necessity from a single ultimate principle (some of the 
reasons for the commitment to such a conception should emerge later in this essay), 
generating problems similar to those posed by scientific determinism. The role of 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) in launching the intense post-Kantian discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Page 22 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
	  	   23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of system and freedom is now a commonplace of the relevant Anglophone literature, 
following the pioneering account in Beiser’s The Fate of Reason. 4	  Because of the bicentenary, which fell in 2009, Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift has been 
the focus of much recent discussion, including at least three collections of essays arising 
from conferences (see Roux 2010, Paetzold and Schneider 2010, and Ferrer and Pedro 
2012). As far as I am aware, however, little attention has been paid to the 
methodological dualism which Schelling advocates in the opening sentences of the 
work, and its consequences. 
5 In responding to misunderstandings of his text Schelling, emphasized that he did not 
intend the term ‘ground’ to be taken in a causal sense, but as ‘fundament, support, 
foundation, basis’ (‘Fundament, Unterlage, Grundlage, Basis’). See Schelling’s letter 
to Georgii, 18 July 1810 (Aus Schellings Leben in Briefen, 221). 
6 At the beginning of the Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen of 1810 Schelling states that 
‘there has long been a system before man thought about creating one – the system of 
the world’ (SW I/7, 421). 
7 For more detailed discussion of Schelling’s theory of evil, in the context of post-
Kantian Idealism, see Dews, The Idea of Evil, ch. 2.  
8 At one point, Gabriel does discuss the fact that the ground ‘tends…towards 
understanding’ (22), but the tenor of his conception of the relation between structure 
and substance is generally impositionist. Although he concedes, at the end of his 
monograph, that Schelling’s aim is the coincidence of substance and structure (or of 
‘content and form’), his interpretation has made this unthinkable, and he is obliged to 
appeal to a ‘divine act of grace’ – a notion not to be found in Schelling’s treatise (see 
AW, 53). 
9 In support of this view, consider that, though we may regret our inadequacies of 
intelligence, strength, creativity and many other things, it is only when plagued by 
moral conscience that we feel damaged in our essential identity. 
10 Gardner is drawing on the account of the centrality of Kant’s ‘fact of reason’ to the 
methodology of German Idealism to be found in ch. 5 of Paul Franks’s All or Nothing. 
11 In this context Schelling anticipates Bernard Williams’s well known ‘one thought too 
many’ argument: ‘He is not conscientious, who, when a case occurs, first has to hold 
the command of duty before himself, in order to decide to do the right thing out of 
respect for it.’ (SW I/7, 393). For a thorough contextualization and analysis of the 
Freiheitsschrift as a critique of Kantian conceptions of freedom as rational autonomy, 
see Dörendahl, Abgrund der Freiheit. 
12 The term ‘incorporation thesis’ was introduced by Allison in Kant’s Theory Freedom, 
5-6. 
13 Soft naturalism is widespread in contemporary philosophy, being represented not 
only by only by post-Rawlsian constructivists, such as Christine Korsgaard, and 
philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein, such as John McDowell, but by interpreters 
of Hegel such as Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard, and Critical Theorists such as Jürgen 
Habermas and Axel Honneth. Peter Strawson seems to have been responsible for 
introducing the term (see Skepticism and Naturalism, 1, and passim). 
14 For an interpretation of Schelling’s late philosophy as a response to the threat of 
nihilism, which – on my reading – is already looming in the Freiheitsschrift, see the 
discussion by Christian Iber, Subjektivität, Vernunft und ihre Kritik, 191-210. 
15 It should be noted that, in Strawson’s usage, there is an asymmetry between hard 
naturalism and soft naturalism. The former is ‘reductionist’, and grants at most 
epiphenomenal validity to its counterpart; soft naturalism, by contrast, concedes a non-
exclusive, but irreducible validity to hard naturalism, albeit one which contradicts hard 
Page 23 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
	  	   24	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
naturalism’s self-understanding. This asymmetry is best communicated by Strawson’s 
term ‘catholic naturalism’, which he offers as a synonym for ‘soft naturalism’ 
(Skepticism and Naturalism, 1, 2, 40, 94). 
16 In his famous lecture commemorating the hundredth anniversary of Schelling’s 
death, ‘Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes’, Paul Tillich 
described Schelling’s thought as seeking to navigate between ‘essentialism’ and 
‘existentialism’. Tillich concluded that, despite the grandeur of his enterprise, Schelling 
failed in this aim. 
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